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Book Review
Does Intellectual Property Law Have Foundations?
A Review of Robert Merges’s Justifying Intellectual
Property
DAVID H. BLANKFEIN-TABACHNICK
Robert Merges’s Justifying Intellectual Property is an ambitious work
of unification in intellectual property law. The book defends a broad and
sweeping thesis addressing the positive law of intellectual property and its
foundation. Justifying Intellectual Property innovatively articulates a set
of normative midlevel principles intended to justify, explain, and predict
intellectual property case outcomes. Further, these midlevel principles are
alleged to be consistent with a wide range of seemingly conflicting and
highly contentious foundational accounts of property ranging from
Lockeanism to liberal egalitarian perspectives. This Book Review
maintains that Merges’s claims of unification, while potentially
groundbreaking, are overbroad. The Review raises skepticism with regard
to the idea that the positive law of intellectual property is actually
governed by normative midlevel principles and argues that the competing
and controversial foundational property theories that Merges addresses
are not equally compatible with the midlevel principles he articulates. The
upshot of the Review is that values other than the midlevel principles
described by Merges may be at play in explaining, predicting, and
justifying intellectual property law case outcomes. The Review further
concludes that proponents of differing views of the strength and structure
of foundational property rights will, at the level of principle, also differ
over competing accounts of intellectual property doctrine.
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Does Intellectual Property Law Have Foundations?
A Review of Robert Merges’s Justifying Intellectual
Property
DAVID H. BLANKFEIN-TABACHNICK
I. INTRODUCTION
Berkeley Law Professor Robert Merges has identified an important
scholarly void in intellectual property law (“IP law”), and his book,
Justifying Intellectual Property,1 is significant not only for calling our
attention to this gap but also for the ways he endeavors to fill it. IP law is
the subject of renewed attention. Increased globalization and transnational
development have fueled this heightened awareness.2 Competing
alternative IP regimes, much like competing tax and transfer schemes, can
have dramatic effects upon wealth distribution, wealth maximization, and,
importantly, the incentives that serve as preconditions to invention and
creation.3 Correspondingly, IP has drawn the attention of a wide range of

Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State Law; Affiliated Transnational
Professor, Peking University, School of Transnational Law. I would like to thank John G. Bennett,
Jamie Dodge, George Fletcher, David Kaye, Steven Kargman, Renee Knake, Jeffrey S. Lehman and
Stephen Yandle for helpful comments and discussions; also, I have learned a great deal from my
engagement with Rob Merges’s work and would like to acknowledge an intellectual debt of gratitude to
him. I am also grateful to Deans Jeffrey S. Lehman and Philip McConnaughay for their encouragement
and generous support of my work. I am thankful to Arielle Hansen, Book Review Editor, Sara
McCollum, Managing Editor, and the anonymous members of the editorial staff at the Connecticut Law
Review for their work and care in editing the piece. I am grateful to Brittany Mouzourakis for superb
research assistance.
This piece was submitted prior to the rulings of Association of Molecular Pathology v. United
States Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133 S. Ct. 694
(2012), and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), the
outcomes of which create a demand for further normative and conceptual discussion.
1
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011).
2
See id. at 1 (“[IP] law today is like . . . [a] sprawling, chaotic megacit[y] of the developing world
. . . [much like] Shanghai. . . . I marvel at the bold, new energy unleashed in the old burgh, and I am not
a little pleased at the prosperity it has brought. But I also feel a distinct sense of unease. . . . [N]ew
growth . . . with no regard for the classic lines . . . brings a slight case of vertigo. . . . It’s an exciting
time, to be sure; but a confusing time too.”).
3
See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying
the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000)
(arguing that wealth redistribution through legal rules is less efficient than redistribution through the
income tax system); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (comparing wealth transfer legal
schemes with the income tax system).
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scholars—e.g., those concerned with international law and development,
the distribution of medical resources,4 tax policy, and the design of
academic institutions5—as well as property scholars working at the
intersection of political and legal philosophy, economics, and law.6 This
recent interest has generated the need for an up-to-date theoretical and
conceptual treatment of the topic. Robert Merges’s wide-ranging and
lively book is welcome in meeting this demand. As he informs his reader
early on, Justifying Intellectual Property “is a reconnaissance and renewal
mission . . . going back to the roots of [IP law] to regain a sense of why it
was founded, where it was centered, and what the . . . original outline
looked like.”7
Merges’s book is a theoretical and justificatory treatment of IP law.8
The book grows out of and expands upon Merges’s previous work in IP; its
aim is to provide a needed systematic rights based or deontological creatorand-inventor-centered account of IP law.9
The book is both
methodological and normative; Merges divides the ideas, principles,
doctrines, and practices of IP law into three categories: foundational
principles; “midlevel principles”; and applied issues.10 Correspondingly,
the book is organized in three sections reflecting these themes or subdivisions. First, the book addresses the fundamental values that Merges
takes to serve as the field’s foundations: the ideas of contemporary liberal
political theory, including Lockeanism, Kantianism, and Rawlsianism.11
Then, in Section II, the book presents what Merges conceives of as the
midlevel principles of IP law (described in Part II of this Review), the
independent normative values that in his estimation animate and govern
actual IP law: the principles of proportionality, efficiency, dignity, and
4
E.g., INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES 233–340 (Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer & Kim Rubenstein eds., 2010) (presenting
articles pertaining to intellectual property and access to essential medicines); see, e.g., AIDAN HOLLIS
& THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 94
(2008) (purporting that the Health Impact Fund is a complementary mechanism to the patent system).
5
E.g., Masao Miyoshi, Technology and the Humanities in the “Global” Economy, in DEFINING
VALUES FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY’S CHANGING ROLE 211, 211–13
(William T. Greenough, Philip J. McConnaughay & Jay P. Kesan eds., 2007) (examining the rise of
university-industry alliances since the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which gave universities the right to
retain patents for federally funded inventions).
6
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007).
7
MERGES, supra note 1, at 1.
8
See id. at 2 (“The major [work] I undertake is conceptual: . . . what are the best justifications,
and how do they shape the contours and limits of [IP law]?”).
9
See id. at ix (“I wanted to suggest some ways that this area of law could be trimmed and tailored
to better serve its main purpose, which for me has always been protecting creative works . . . and
rewarding creative people.”).
10
Id. at x.
11
Id. at 13.
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12

non-removal.
Finally in Section III, the book discusses the practical
issues involved in IP law: the rights of creative professionals and corporate
ownership, property in the digital era, and the role IP law plays in the
provision of medications in the developing world.13
Justifying Intellectual Property opens by presenting Merges’s tripartite
topology of IP law; yet, he suggests that in understanding IP law, we must
start in the middle—and not with the field’s foundations. The book
defends a striking position: while foundational values may, in some
fashion, serve to inform IP law, it would be a mistake to hold that
foundational property theory holds a direct conceptual or principled
constraint on midlevel principles of IP law.14 Instead, in Merges’s view,
the actual rules, doctrines, and practices that comprise the law of IP are
governed by a set of non-foundational, midlevel normative principles or
regulatory ideals that operate between foundational principles and applied
issues or doctrine.15 Midlevel principles, for Merges, have not only a
practical priority over foundational values, but also a conceptual
independence from such values.16
Such midlevel principles as
proportionality, efficiency, dignity, and non-removal, Merges argues, serve
as the “basic concepts that tie together . . . discrete and detailed doctrines,
rules, and practices [of IP law]”17 and, therefore, occupy a practical or legal
priority over foundational property theory.18
In this vein, Justifying Intellectual Property presents itself as a work of
legal theory, even given its philosophical sophistication and its
engagement, at the first order, with the “positive” law of IP. In aiming to
justify IP law, Merges, in essence, defends what one might describe as a
theoretical middle-ground-position, compelling to those who hold that
property scholarship sometimes falls squarely between two stools: either
too driven by legalistic rules and doctrines and surface-level values to be
properly understood as theoretical or principled, or too philosophical and
abstract to properly be understood as legal. As rich and intriguing as the
argument is, this Review maintains that Merges’s compatibilist account of
the foundational philosophical values at work in IP law—and what he
describes as the field’s independent midlevel principles—is overdrawn.
12

Id. at 139.
Id. at viii.
14
See id. at 140 (“I believe in the independence of these foundational normative principles from
. . . midlevel principles.”).
15
See id. (explaining that detailed doctrines and practices come first, that midlevel principles arise
from them, and that upper-level or foundational principles are at the top of the hierarchy).
16
Id.
17
Id. at 139.
18
See id. at 140 (“It is at the level of midlevel principles . . . that . . . normative debate in the IP
field takes place. . . . [I]n fact, this is their role exactly: they enable normative debate—debate above
the detailed doctrinal level—without requiring deep agreement about ultimate [or foundational]
normative commitments. . . . [T]hey are the common currency of most debate over IP policy.”).
13
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Part III of the Review describes and evaluates Merges’s
conceptualization of IP law, which aims to unify IP doctrine through
normative midlevel principles as well as facially conflicting and
controversial accounts of foundational property theories. This Part raises
skepticism with regard to Merges’s idea that the positive law of intellectual
property is actually governed by the normative midlevel principles that he
describes. This Part further argues that such midlevel principles do not
explain, justify or predict case outcomes. Part IV demonstrates the lack of
general compatibility between Merges’s account of IP law’s purported
midlevel principles and salient features of the foundational theories he
discusses. Part V addresses the range of compatibility of Merges’s
midlevel principles and foundational property theories. This Part shows
that Merges’s case for compatibility is strongest in the context of nonmaximizing, pre-institutional property (e.g., Lockean) theories, but less so
in the context of post-institutional, maximizing foundational theories (e.g.,
Rawlsianism). Part V takes up Merges’s thoughts on public debate and
pluralism and his midlevel principle strategy for resolving foundational
property disputes. This Part concludes that IP law disagreements may run
well beyond the scope of midlevel principles and illustrates this point via
the dispute over the strength of pharmaceutical patents and the welfare of
the developing world. Part VI concludes by raising skepticism with regard
to Merges’s claim that midlevel principles drive the positive law of IP and
maintains that Merges’s claim of general unification in IP law is
overbroad.
II. MERGES’S CONCEPTUALIZATION
Justifying Intellectual Property is a skillful work articulating a bold
thesis. Merges’s tripartite topology effectively organizes the sizable body
of material he addresses. This organizational approach is not only of
organizational or pedagogical value; Merges attaches normative and
methodological significance to the distinctions he draws. For as broad as
the book is, a number of interesting and closely related themes run
throughout. First is that idea that midlevel principles—chiefly, the
principles of proportionality19 and non-removal,20 and to a lesser degree,

19
Id. at 8 (“Throughout IP law there is an impulse to tailor a creator’s property right in a way that
reflects his contribution. This is the proportionality principle. There is a distinctly Lockean flavor to
this principle (though it makes sense on utilitarian grounds as well) . . . . At its heart it is about basic
fairness: the scope of a property right ought to be commensurate with the magnitude of the contribution
underlying the right.”).
20
Id. at 145 (“[The public] domain . . . is the end product of the nonremoval principle. Because it
is the product of many disparate doctrines, and was not itself launched as a unitary concept, we should
not be surprised to see a great diversity in conceptions of it.”).
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the principles of dignity and efficiency —as opposed to foundational
values (i.e., general theories of contemporary political philosophy and their
respective accounts of property) regulate IP doctrine.23 Second is the idea
that midlevel principles have an independence of foundational values. And
third is the idea that this independence from foundational values allows
midlevel principles, which animate the positive law of IP, to be, at once,
compatible with various competing foundations.24
21

22

A. Independence of IP Law’s Midlevel Principles
For Merges, IP law is a self-contained field. The rules, doctrines, and
practices of IP law implicitly bear their own set of normative principles
and these ideals, in turn, are neither derived from nor are they instrumental
to the practical instantiation of foundational principles.25 Instead, for
Merges, identifying midlevel principles is an inductive exercise.
Methodologically, “one looks for the common conceptual threads in a field
and treats them as instances or manifestations of a more complete
principle.”26 Merges’s idea is to start with ground-level practices and
abstract “upward,” toward a unifying principle that explains and
rationalizes the practices.27
The purported upshot is that IP law is consistent with a wide range of
foundational property theories; but midlevel principles do not “depend”
upon “any particular set” of foundations.28
So, Merges conceives of IP doctrine and practice as governed or
regulated by a group of principles that are, although abstract, implicit in the
field.29 For Merges, in understanding IP law we look first to the legal
21
Id. at 156 (“The dignity principle lies behind . . . IP law. It is the principle that says the creator
of a work should be respected and recognized in ways that extend beyond the traditional package of
rights associated with property: the right to exclude, to alienate (sell or license), to use as one wishes,
and so forth. There is often a nonpecuniary dimension . . . and . . . the interests it protects . . . continue
after a creator sells the rights to a given creative work. . . . [I]ssues . . . where dignity is relevant are
often the closest the formal legal system comes to recognizing . . . [the] personal imprint placed on a
work by its creator—familiar elements of Kantian and Hagelian property theory.”).
22
Id. at 153 (“Efficiency guarantees that whatever entitlements the legal system starts with, they
will be allocated to their highest-valued use as cheaply and quickly as possible.”).
23
But cf. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 19
(2002) (arguing in the context of tax policy that independent principles or metrics of tax policy
analysis, e.g., the benefit or equal sacrifice principles, are inconsistent with distributive principles and
every plausible conception of liberalism).
24
See MERGES, supra note 1, at 140 (“[T]here is ‘room at the bottom,’ at the foundational level of
the field, for various justificatory principles . . . . Midlevel principles . . . do not depend on any
particular set of values for their validity.”).
25
See id. (asserting the independence of midlevel principles of IP).
26
Id.
27
See id. at 9 (“[T]he operative principles of the IP system are the midlevel principles . . . .”).
28
Id.
29
See id. (“Midlevel principles . . . are the common currency of most debate over IP . . . .”).
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doctrine, and in doing so, we find a wide array of seemingly disparate rules
and legal doctrines that have grown up over time as a response to newly
arising conditions.30 In understanding these seemingly disparate rules and
doctrines, he calls us to look for abstract principles common to the various
rules, despite the more concrete differences between them.31 In this
conceptual analysis, one may “induce the principle from the details of the
specific rules and practices.”32 The idea is that while the rules and
doctrines of legal practice vary, there are implicit in these rules midlevel
principles to be induced,33 and these principles, in turn, serve to explain
and justify the rules and the doctrine. So, for Merges, one moves from
rules, doctrine, and practice, to more abstract unifying principles; these
principles, once refined, in turn serve in either a justificatory capacity, an
explanatory capacity or, perhaps, both.34
Justification and explanation, of course, are not mutually exclusive—
some explanations are justifications. From the text, however, Merges’s
position in this regard is not entirely clear. It seems that his analysis of
midlevel principles, given the claim of independence from foundational
values, might, at best, explain or predict the positive law, as opposed to
justify it. That is, midlevel principles might predict case outcomes or
provide a needed inference in explaining the law as social phenomenon,
where a unified explanation of seemingly disparate data is needed. It does
not follow, however, that simply because a set of principles are implicit in
a consensus or social practice, a set of rules or in legal doctrine, and
because conceptual analysis is capable of bringing these principles to the
surface, that the principles are themselves justificatory principles. Here, it
seems that absent a significant foundational constraint, which Merges
appears to deny, so-called midlevel principles would remain, at best,
explanatory as opposed to justificatory. To his credit, Merges does briefly
indicate a link between midlevel principles and foundations: “Midlevel
principles engage foundational values in a number of ways, but they do not
depend on any particular set of values for their validity”35 But, he never
elaborates on the nature or substance of this engagement and his strong
claims of midlevel independence would appear to be in significant tension
See id. at 139 (arguing that midlevel principles tie together “disparate doctrines and practices”).
See id. at 143 (“Identifying midlevel principles is an inductive exercise: one looks for the
common conceptual threads in a field and treats them as instances or manifestations of a more complete
principle.”).
32
Id.
33
See id. at 141 (“[P]rinciples can be identified out of a welter of doctrines and rules . . . .”).
34
See id. at 140–43 (First indicating a justificatory role, “this is their role exactly: [midlevel
principles] enable normative debate—debate above the detailed doctrinal level,” but also indicating that
the midlevel principle of nonremoval “ties together and explains each of these rules in terms of a
broader conception.”).
35
Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
30
31
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with this claim.
Yet, midlevel principles, for Merges, are crucial to legal theory. It is
only midlevel principles that are capable of “actual” legal work and operate
at the heart of legal debate.36 Merges discusses the bounds of the public
domain; maintaining that his midlevel principle of nonremoval is essential
in the legal context to providing answers to questions concerning the
strength, breadth, and length of time involved in the assignment of various
IP rights.37 Likewise, he claims that it is his midlevel principle of
proportionality, as opposed to foundational values, that distinguishes
between “rent-seeking” behavior and “investment.”38 Further, the principle
of proportionality is operative in “the nonobviousness requirement” in
patent law where “an invention is patentable only if it represents a
nontrivial advance.”39 In other words, “[t]he award of a patent is . . .
calibrated so that only significant inventions are rewarded. . . . [with a]
property right . . . when a . . . contribution is proportional to the legal right
at stake.”40 Additionally, the proportionality principle shows specifically
“when courts feel comfortable modifying the entitlement structure of
already-issued IP rights to correct for undue leverage”;41 that is, when the
court engages in breaking-up an anti-commons because existing
entitlements give someone “‘excessive’ or ‘disproportionate’ leverage,” as
in the context of “patents for small snippets of genes made possible by
modern sequencing technology.”42
The claim that midlevel principles control in answering these questions
is crucial to Merges’s view. But, the conclusion to which Merges’s
examples point is that a normative principle or normatively salient
benchmark is required to resolve these issues; it is less clear that the
midlevel principles he articulates are the operative normative values at
stake. Consider the disproportionate leveraging example in the context of
the prominent eBay IP case.43 Here, the Federal Circuit upholds an
injunction providing a patentee with additional leverage in licensing as “a
natural consequence of the right to exclude.”44 The Supreme Court of the
United States vacates the judgment.45 Merges maintains:
36

Id.
See id. at 141–42 (explaining the principle of nonremoval by examining what information can
be protected by IP rights, the duration of IP rights, and the “zone of expression” around freely available
works).
38
Id. at 171.
39
Id. at 161.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 181.
42
Id. at 160.
43
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
44
MercExchange, LLC v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
45
eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394.
37
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The Supreme Court takes the position that it may in proper
cases look behind the leverage created by a property right.
This inquiry . . . reveals the heart of the proportionality
principle. . . . The contribution of the property owner is
weighed against the economic leverage the right provides in
actual market transactions.46
For Merges, where this relationship lacks balance, the court will intervene
to create proportionality.47
It is unclear, however, that it is Merges’s principle of proportionality
that is operative in the case. What is clear is that the Supreme Court
reverses for a normative reason, which disallows such a holdout or such
market leverage.48 Simply because there is a tradeoff, it does not follow
that the Court has invoked Merges’s principle of proportionality—the
(foundational) utility principle, a principle notoriously antagonistic to the
notions of “fairness” embedded in the principle of proportionality, may
yield a similar result demanding efficiency via the break-up of an anticommons,49 as the empirical facts of the situation may mandate.50
Merges’s claim that midlevel principles control IP case outcomes cannot
be sustained.
Further, it is not clear that the Court is balancing what Merges
describes as the “contribution” (i.e., the backward-looking moral or
economic desert) of the right holder with the “leverage” the right
provides;51 in fact, the Court balances a patented “small component” with
“undue leverage.”52 There is no mention of a relationship between the
46

MERGES, supra note 1, at 167.
Id.
48
See eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 392–93 (“As in our decision today, this Court has consistently
rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed.” (citations omitted)).
49
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699, 701 (1998) (noting that the development of useful
products may require the removal of obstacles and other restrictions within a patent system that both
increase costs and slow pace of such development).
50
See Smith, supra note 6, at 1781 (“It is ultimately an empirical question at what point the
uncertainty in the contours of intellectual property rights leads to serious enough holdout problems to
justify a move away from injunctions (property rules) toward damages (liability rules).”); see also
Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 783, 841 (2007) (“In identifying core cases where one regime or another is most effective,
scholars can isolate the hardest cases where closer empirical investigation is necessary. In our view,
the holdup scenario that can arise in patent . . . regulation clearly justifies a case-specific liability rule . .
. .”).
51
MERGES, supra note 1, at 167.
52
eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When the patented invention is but
a small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to
compensate for the infringement . . . .”).
47
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backward-looking notion of desert (implicit in Merges’s idea of “the
contribution of the property owner”)53 and market leverage—again, the
tradeoff addressed may equally well be one of simple utility, invoking no
midlevel principle.
Additionally, were midlevel principles to be
understood not only as normative principles, but also as predictive or
descriptive of case outcomes, Merges’s claim would require significant
empirical analysis into case outcomes—well beyond the methods his book
employs.
Merges, however, takes foundational philosophical ideas seriously and,
presumably, holds that they are, in some fashion, important to IP law. As I
say, the book thoughtfully considers IP ramifications of three prominent,
competing foundational approaches to property in the liberal tradition.
Yet, Merges is clear: he does not allow the regulatory ideals of IP law—the
field’s “midlevel” principles that “spring from doctrine and detail, from the
grain of actual practice,”54 principles that “do not depend on any particular
set of [fundamental] values for their validity”55—to be overtaken by
foundational theory. Instead, Merges requires the “independence of . . .
foundational normative principles from the operational details of [IP law],
as well as from the midlevel principles that arise from and are shaped by
those [operational] details.”56
B. Merges’s Foundational Pluralism
Merges indicates that foundational principles are “at the top of this
hierarchy”—“what lies beyond [midlevel] principles . . . is a set of ‘upperlevel’ principles, which correspond roughly to deep or foundational . . .
values.”57 It would, of course, be natural to conceive of “midlevel”
principles as being constrained or governed by foundational principles.
Indeed, for the consequentialists among us, any midlevel principles,
metrics of analysis, or regulatory norms concerning property arrangements,
were they to exist, would either give way in the face of conflict, or else
have been constructed instrumentally in service to meeting the demands of
distributive principles.
But this is not Merges’s position; instead, he finds compatibility
between a plurality of foundations and his articulated midlevel principles.58
53

MERGES, supra note 1, at 167.
Id. at 140.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See id. at 10 (“My theory of IP includes . . . foundational pluralism. . . . [T]he great virtue of
pluralism is that I can engage in a meaningful way with those who . . . place their faith in other
foundations altogether. Midlevel principles provide our common space, our place of engagement.
They . . . allow[] us all to play together, even if we disagree . . . .”).
54
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In doing so, Merges largely leaves open the question of the normative
control assigned to foundational principles.
Merges is clear that
foundational values lie behind midlevel values and purports to take them
seriously;59 yet, one is less certain in his model exactly how, if at all, such
foundational principles (at the top of his normative hierarchy) are to
interact with, or exert normative force upon midlevel principles and,
consequently, guide legal doctrine given his strong views of the
“‘independence’”60 of midlevel principles from foundations.
To his credit, Merges himself recognizes the importance of these
issues, posing a variant of these questions and answering at both the
operational and theoretical level; his answers to these questions, I believe,
articulate the central claim of the book:
What would it do to our thinking about the field [of IP law] if
the deep substratum could be changed under our feet . . . ?
The answer at the operational level is: not much. That’s
because the operational principles of the IP system are the
midlevel principles . . . . Efficiency, Nonremoval,
Proportionality and Dignity—these basic principles . . . are
largely independent of the deep conceptual justifications of
IP protection. Except in a few boundary cases, [foundations]
rarely do much direct work, or make a large practical
difference, to the IP system in its day-to-day operation.
What about at the theoretical level? What would it do to our
understanding of the field if we shifted from one foundation
to another? . . . My theory of IP includes this foundational
pluralism. . . . In the vast majority of cases, the new
normative grounding does not affect my view of correct
policy in any way. It may help me resolve borderline cases,
and perhaps might lead me to favor an owner or rightholder
in a close case or at the margin.61
So, given their range of practice-oriented and doctrinal-level
application, midlevel principles are taken to have a legal priority over
foundational theories, yet Merges importantly purports not to be a skeptic
of normative foundations.62 He finds compatibility between his midlevel
principles and foundational theories.
Merges maintains, perhaps
surprisingly, that there is plenty of conceptual “room at the bottom”63 and
59

Id. at 140.
Id. (“Midlevel principles . . . do not depend on any particular set of [foundational] values for
their validity.”).
61
Id. at 9–11 (emphasis added).
62
See id. at 11 ([N]ormative grounding . . . helps me push on through foundational doubts.”).
63
Id. at 10, 140.
60
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that his three, arguably conflicting, foundational conceptions of property
are not only compatible—at the level of principle—with midlevel
principles, but also that these conflicting foundations “may serve equally
well to anchor the principles and practices of IP law,”64 which—to be
clear—he understands as inclusive of midlevel principles.65 Merges’s “aim
is to [conjoin] social practices and institutions; midlevel principles, such as
efficiency and proportionality; and the foundational concepts of Locke,
Kant, and Rawls, in a single coherent theory of the IP field.”66 Merges
offers what he describes as the foundational property conceptions of Kant,
Locke, and Rawls, which in his view are the foundations that “best justify
the structure of IP law,” but “other foundations might serve as well.”
Merges continues that “there is [again] ‘room at the bottom’ at the
foundational level of the field, for various justificatory principles,
including perhaps utilitarianism and various alternative ethical theories.”67
III. FOUNDATIONS
But still, important issues remain: the foundational values Merges
discusses themselves offer competing liberal conceptions of property.
These competing foundational theories, at the level of principle, are in
tension with one another; this is a point that Merges catches quickly, but
then releases: “For me, a lock-solid utilitarian case might someday unseat
deontological rights as [IP’s] foundation.”68 Further, there is not only the
possibility of conflict between foundational principles, but also the conflict
between foundational principles and midlevel principles. For Merges, of
course, midlevel principles are range limited; they exert normative control
over legal doctrine. Foundational principles presumably bear a different,
although unspecified by Merges, range of application. But, importantly for
Merges, they are not addressed to legal doctrine.69
In conventional thinking, Merges’s foundational property principles
serve a justificatory role—they, over their relevant domains, crucially
provide definitive normative answers to questions of justice in economic
distribution, property baselines, details of ownership and rights of
entitlement.70 Since these property rights are, in practice, set by legal
doctrine as well as tax and economic policy (inclusive of IP law) and since
64

Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
See id. at 139 (identifying “the four primary midlevel principles in IP law: nonremoval . . . ;
proportionality; efficiency; and dignity.”).
66
Id. at 13.
67
Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
68
Id. at 10.
69
See id. at 140 (stating Merges’s “belie[f] in the independence of . . . foundational normative
principles from . . . midlevel principles” which, he notes, are addressed to legal doctrine).
70
See id. (noting Merges’s view that justificatory principles exist at the foundational level of IP
law).
65
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IP doctrine is, in Merges’s account, under the nearly exclusive control of
midlevel principles, it would appear that foundational values,
conventionally understood as fixing terms of ownership, and midlevel
principles, as Merges understands them, are addressed to identical
questions: the details of property rights. But, if this is true, conflict would
appear imminent.71 Once the justificatory force of foundational principles
is introduced, it is not clear that Merges can escape it so easily. I elaborate
my concern in the context of Rawlsian theory, a dominant approach for
Merges,72 which he (too) contrasts with pre-institutional property
conceptions.73
A. Conceptions of Property: Pre-Institutionalism and PostInstitutionalism
The first section of the book describes basic positions in foundational
property theory. Merges does an accurate job of describing and
articulating Kantian, Lockean, and Rawlsian liberal political theory. The
first section of the book is largely exegetical—this section is a reliable and
sound resource for those with an IP bent interest in a solid introduction to
liberal property theory. I am in agreement with much of what Merges
details; indeed, I am in particularly strong agreement with several of the
observations and claims of the book’s first section concerning
Rawlsianism. In what follows, I would like to illuminate these points of
agreement with Merges, casting them in a somewhat brighter light, as it
seems the theoretical ramifications of these observations—namely, the
distinction between pre-institutional and post-institutional conceptions of
property, the maximizing and consequentialist nature of Rawls’s principles
of justice, and the role that Rawls principles of justice74 play in defining a
conception of justice may be underappreciated by Merges. Ultimately, I
believe they hold a greater significance for his midlevel principles of IP,
and his methodology in general, than Justifying Intellectual Property may
recognize.
For Merges, there is a crucial distinction between Lockean (or naturalrights) conceptions of liberalism and other liberal conceptions of

71

See id. (explaining that midlevel principles exert normative control over legal doctrine).
See id. (Merges offers Rawls’s theory of distributive justice among others because he takes
such foundations to “best justify the structure of IP law.”).
73
See id. at 35, 140 (Merges accepts aspects of the Lockean pre-political state of nature—as one
that animates his view of IP law.).
74
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971) (“First Principle: Each person is to have
an equal right to the most extensive total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of
liberty for all. Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged [‘the difference principle’] . . . . and (b) attached
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”).
72
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75

liberalism: namely, the distinction between pre- and post-institutional
conceptions of property.76 For pre-institutional liberals, fundamental
economic concepts, including aspects of IP, are conceived of as
normatively prior to political institutions. For such pre-institutional
theorists, there is neither a normative nor a conceptual demand for political
institutions in defining the property rights and economic liberties that turn
upon them—such theories instead engage the backward looking (prepolitical) notions of desert and entitlement in defining property rights.77
Post-institutional liberals, on the other hand, maintain that political and
legal institutions play a necessary role in defining the details of economic
arrangements.78 Political institutions and the distributive principles that
define them are taken to be normatively and conceptually required in the
construction of basic economic concepts.79 Absent the institutional
instantiation of such principles, morality and justice are simply silent on
matters of property as well as any rights derivative of the instrumentalist
conception of property.80 So, here, property and economic institutions are
designed in service to distributive principles, but pre-political morality is—
in the first instance—agnostic with regard to the actual content of such
principles.81 For Rawls, for example, the pre-institutional values of
75
MERGES, supra note 1, at 35 (“Locke argu[es] that on the basis of this prepolitical [property]
right to individual appropriation, people come together to form governments.” (emphasis added)).
76
Id. at 95 (describing the post-political account of property and IP rights as “not really
conceivable without a state, so they cannot in any sense precede the state, at least not in their final,
mature form”).
77
See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149–51 (1974) (stating his view that “a
distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution,” and
contrasting this view with a statist or redistributive account, while making no mention of the state’s
playing a role in a distribution he deems just); see also A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF
RIGHTS 223 (1992) (expressing the Lockean principle that “labor in creating or improving a thing gives
one special claim to it”).
78
See RAWLS, supra note 76, at 10 (“[W]hat properly belongs to a person and . . . what is due to
him . . . [are] very often derived from social institutions and the legitimate expectations to which they
give rise.”); id. at 311 (“A just scheme . . . satisfies [man’s] legitimate expectations as founded upon
social institutions.”); id. at 314 (same).
79
See id. at 11 (“[W]e are not to think of the original [social] contract as one . . . to set up a
particular form of government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic
structure of society are the object of the original agreement. . . . [T]hose who engage in social
cooperation choose together . . . the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and to
determine the division of social benefits.” (emphasis added)).
80
See id. at 12 (“Among the essential features of [the pre-government ‘primitive condition’] is
that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his
fortune in the distribution of natural assets . . . .”).
81
See id. at 313 (“[W]hen just economic arrangements exist, the claims of individuals are
properly settled by reference to the rules and precepts . . . which these practices take as relevant. . . . [I]t
is incorrect to say that just distributive shares reward individuals according to the [pre-political notion
of] moral worth. But what we can say is that . . . a just scheme . . . allots to each what he is entitled to
as defined by the scheme itself. The principles of justice for institutions and individuals establish that
doing this is fair.”).
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freedom and equality that motivate the Original Position (“O.P.”) are in
the first instance silent with regard to the details of economic rights and
economic desert, inclusive of IP. Such fundamental values as freedom and
equality inform the selection of the principles of justice and therefore guide
institutional design, but the details of basic economic matters are not
normatively primitive. Notions of economic desert are constructed, postinstitutionally by Rawls’s two principles of justice.83
82

B. Maximizing, Consequentialist “Foundational” Principles
Next, Merges at various points in his discussion of Rawls and
distributive justice acknowledges my second point above, that the two
principles of justice are in their application both consequentialist and
maximizing.84 These features of Rawlsianism,85 although laudably
recognized by Merges, are often and understandably misunderstood in the
literature given Rawls’s avowed general commitment to Kantian
deontology, even if not in the application of the principles of justice
themselves.86 Although the values enshrined in the principles of justice,
taken in lexical order, reflect the deontological features of the O.P., the
principles of justice (themselves) once adopted function as consequentialist
maximizing principles in selecting between competing complete schemes
of legal and political institutions, including all economic and property
constructions. The principles (themselves) are forward-looking.87 They
evaluate (complete) competing legal and political schemes in a purely
outcome based manner.88 They evaluate such schemes in terms of the
quality of life (as measured in terms of an objective index of primary
goods) that citizens living under different schemes may reasonably
82
See id. at 17–22 (describing “the original position [(“O.P.”)] as the appropriate initial status quo
which insures the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair”). The O.P. is Rawls’s idealized social
choice scenario in which representatives select political and economic principles so as to maximize
their self-interest under less than perfect knowledge conditions from behind a veil of ignorance.
83
See id. at 313.
84
MERGES, supra note 1, at 104 (“Rawls’s specific formulation [of the economic component of
the second principle of justice] is often described as the ‘maximin’ principle (short for maximizing the
minimum): inequalities are tolerated only insofar as they maximize the minimum level of support in a
society, that is, the support for the least advantaged.” (emphasis added)).
85
See Thomas W. Pogge, Three Problems with Contractarian-Consequentialist Ways of
Assessing Social Institutions, 12 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, June 1995, at 241, 244 (evaluating justice of
institutional schemes as “a function of the quality of the individual lives (Qi) each tends to produce”).
86
MERGES, supra note 1, at 104 (“[Rawls’s] system of thought begins with a Kantian focus on the
rights of each individual, but then integrates this with an emphasis on the . . . distribution of resources.”
(emphasis added)).
87
See id. at 107 (“Rawls starts with egalitarian fairness and adjusts for property rights, in contrast
to Locke and Kant who (roughly speaking) begin with property and then adjust for collective
fairness.”).
88
Id.
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expect.
The principles of justice are indifferent, for example, to all
“backward looking” moral concern (i.e., how it is that results have come
about—whether through luck or desert). In this sense, the principles of
justice are consequentialist.90
C. Distributive Principles Defining Justice and Ownership
These two features of Rawlsianism lead naturally into my third point
above, which is also consistent with Merges, namely, that moving forward
from the O.P., Rawls’s two principles of justice are, as a matter of pure
procedural justice, definitive of the post-institutional conception of justice,
including all economic and property oriented claims.91 This feature of
Rawlsianism renders the inner workings of the Rawlsian legal and political
scheme immune to objections of injustice or unfairness rooted in preinstitutional or exogenous free-floating notions of fairness, or pre-political
claims of economic desert. Such objections to the political and legal
institutions constructed in service to the principles of justice grounded in
pre-institutional conceptions of justice are rendered either incoherent or
irrelevant. The two principles of justice define a conception of justice.
IV. DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES AND MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES OF IP LAW
A. The Incompatibility
My claim is that the Rawlsian post-institutional conception of justice
has little conceptual space for principled commitment to concepts
embodied in any alternative approach to liberalism. This incompatibility,
in my view, derives from these important, although often underappreciated
features of Rawlsianism. Rawlsianism appears to stand in sharp contrast to
the middle position Merges develops; there is a fundamental
incompatibility between the Rawlsian, post-institutional, maximizing
conception of distributive justice and any independent or free-standing
midlevel principles of IP law of the kind Merges articulates and defends.92
I have elsewhere articulated what I take to be the proper “Rawlsian”
view of private law (e.g., bankruptcy, property, contract, tort, and private
89
See id. (“It follows that the fruits or proceeds from these lucky endowments are fair game for
redistribution under Rawls’s second principle. . . . So unless the proceeds from a lucky endowment
happen to help the destitute, those proceeds can be taken and given away to people in greater need.”).
90
See Pogge, supra note 85, at 244 (clearly elucidating these consequentialist and forwardlooking aspects of Rawls’s two principles of justice).
91
Id. at 102–03 (“[T]he starting point for discussion [of Rawls’s work] is not fairness within the
institution of property, but the fairness of property itself, considered in its overall social and economic
context. For Rawls, the key question is whether, and to what extent, the very existence of private
property promotes a fair distribution . . . .”).
92
See id. at 11, 140.
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ordering), maintaining that the maximizing (though non-utilitarian) postinstitutional aspects of the Rawlsian conception of liberalism render it
incompatible with competing, pre-institutional accounts of liberalism and
their respective, free-standing or independent, conceptions of the private
law (e.g., the ex post conception of contract94 or the corrective justice
conception of tort95)—these strike me as analogous to what Merges
describes as midlevel principles.96 Merges acknowledges this work on
private law “discussing Rawls’s two principles of justice and how they
apply to private associations.”97 But, he appears not to push the point to its
logical conclusion: that there is a principled conflict between the
alternative sets of values, implicit in his midlevel principles and the values
he takes to serve as the foundations of IP law.
Merges is certainly correct that IP law undoubtedly has a very
significant impact on maximizing the position of the least well off, in terms
of the distribution of primary goods—correspondingly, IP law ought to be
understood, for Rawls, as being subject to the two principles of justice. In
this, Merges and I are in nearly complete agreement. Given the above
incompatibility, however, Merges must either concede that his midlevel
principles of IP, invoking notions of pre-political economic desert and
property claims, can be accommodated as only a matter of functional
overlap (i.e., empirical frequency) with the demands of the overarching
distributive principles, or counter-intuitively, abandon these commitments
and his commitment to midlevel principles. Since such principles are
maximizing, it is unlikely, then, that there is room in the complete
constructed scheme for a set of (deontic) midlevel constraints, for example,
the principle of proportionality, embodying the values of fairness and
economic desert.
Further, Merges’s midlevel principles (e.g., proportionality and
93
E.g., Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Blankfein Tabachnick, The Rawlsian View of Private
Ordering, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, July 2008, at 288, 306–07 (arguing that “[d]espite the ambiguity in
the Rawlsian texts, the right to freedom of association for Rawls is not . . . a basic right” and that “the
proper role of property in the Rawlsian scheme” resolves such ambiguity); Kevin A. Kordana & David
H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 632 (2005) (arguing that
“Rawlsianism is [not] silent on matters of contract and private ordering, as has conventionally and
historically been maintained”).
94
See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
1 (1981) (arguing that “[t]he promise principle . . . is the moral basis of contract law”).
95
See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237–38 (Jeremy Horder ed., 4th ed. 2000) (examining the
conceptual and normative relationship between corrective and distributive justice); Arthur Ripstein,
The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1811 (2004) (arguing
that “implicit in Rawls’s writing is a powerful and persuasive account of the normative significance of
tort law and corrective justice”).
96
MERGES, supra note 1, at 139.
97
Id. at 379 (citing Kordana & Blankfein Tabachnick, The Rawlsian View of Private Ordering,
supra note 93, at 288).
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nonremoval) conceptually require property baselines in making their
normative assessments (i.e., the background conditions of ownership
which define the terms of any reference to a commons or private property).
The Rawlsian position, however, is that, strictly speaking, all significant
economic constructions are understood as second principle of justice
matters, maximizing the position of the least well-off.98 Given, as I say,
that principles of proportionality and nonremoval require relevant
moralized property baselines and must, therefore, be largely constructed as
second principle matters, maximizing the position of the least well-off, it
would appear then that Merges’s midlevel principles must yield to the
overarching distributive principles. This is a demand that I am not certain
Merges’s appeal to foundational pluralism can escape.
Return now to IP; given that all legal institutions must be constructed
instrumentally in answer to the maximizing demands of the principles of
justice, such legal institutions are by definition distributive in nature. The
point is simply that all legal rules for Rawlsianism are selected because of
their (instrumental) role in the overall set of political and legal institutions
that maximize the position of the least well off, while meeting the demands
of the first principle of justice and the opportunity principle in lexical
order.99
B.

Pre-Institutional Foundations and the Range of Principled
Compatibility with Midlevel Principles

I openly acknowledge, however, that in the context of pre-institutional
(non-maximizing) liberalism, where the private law need not answer to
overarching justice oriented distributive principles, my case is not as
strong as it is in the context of maximizing post-institutionalism. Here,
since the foundational principles are non-maximizing, there may be
conceptual space for Merges’s midlevel principles. As a normative matter,
midlevel principles and foundation do not always peacefully coexist; the
compatibility between foundations and midlevel principles is, as one would
expect, a function of the content of the foundational principles. So, the
view Merges articulates is more likely to find a home in the context of preinstitutional Lockean liberalism where independent or midlevel constraints
need not yield to maximizing distributive principles.100 Here I say likely to
find a home because, as stated above, the precise role of midlevel
principles, whether explanatory, justificatory or both, is left more vague
98
Id. at 104–05 (stating that the right to hold property, a feature of the first principle of justice, is
not necessarily in line with the principle of fairness).
99
Id. at 104.
100
See Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Taxation, the Private Law and Distributive
Justice, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, July 2006, at 142, 154 (analogously discussing the compatibility of
independent normative tax policy modules with pre-institutional conceptions of property and justice).
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than one might hope, particularly given the significant weight Merges
assigns to them.101
V. MERGES’S PLURALISM AND APPLICATION
A. Pluralism and Midlevel Principles as Public Debate
Merges’s compatibility thesis often appeals to foundational
pluralism.102 His idea is that in the context of IP law, appeals to
foundations, interestingly as they are, again, are theoretically and
foundationally irrelevant to resolving IP questions.103 Regardless of one’s
foundational commitments, according to Merges, we can engage in public
and legal debate through merely the use of his midlevel principles.104
Merges’s idea is that midlevel principles of IP are a set of non-foundational
values that all, regardless of prior or foundational commitments, can accept
as normative principles in IP disputes.105 While there may be reasons to
compromise among the proponents of competing foundational principles, I
am not certain that the idea of normative agreement drawn from the idea of
an overlapping consensus will ultimately serve Merges’s purpose. The
extent or range of such empirical regularity or overlap, or whether such
overlap exists at all, is unclear. For example, utilitarianism demands a set
of legal and economic institutions concerning the details of ownership
which the Rawlsian denies—the range of overlap is problematic, as is the
normative force of any such mere empirical regularity. There remains a
problem with normativity.
B. Application
My concern with the normative compatibility of competing
foundations with midlevel principles may be clear in an applied context.
Consider pharmaceuticals and the developing world, a topic important to
Merges which he, interestingly, does discuss, in the first instance, contra
his view, in terms of foundational values as opposed to midlevel
principles.106 There is debate over the question of the loss of market
101
See id. at 141 (stating that “[m]idlevel principles create an overlapping consensus among
people with differing believes about the ultimate normative foundations of IP law”).
102
Id. at 10; see id. at 141 (“My version of [midlevel principles] derives, as many will recognize,
from John Rawls’s conception of pluralism in a modern state.”).
103
Id. at 10–11 (“[Kant and Locke] provide a grounding outside the contours of my field as
conventionally practice, one that helps me resolve foundational doubts and get back to work
confidently ‘inside’ my field.”).
104
Id.
105
Id. at 104.
106
See id. at 277 (“I have couched the pharmaceutical patent issue in the language of the various
foundational theories . . . : Locke, Kant, and Rawls as well as utilitarian theory . . . . If I am to stay true
to the pluralism I espouse . . . it would seem necessary also to discuss the issue in terms of the midlevel
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freedom in the developing world caused by the strength—in duration of
time—of monopolistic patents protecting pharmaceutical innovation. It is
thought that patents are required so that investors and creators are
compensated for their energies and investment in research and
development; a market-limiting rule (i.e., patent) that disallows the
creation of generic pharmaceuticals is required for pharmaceutical research
and development to proceed. 107 There is a tradeoff between the
deservingness and (ex ante) incentives of investors and creators and the
loss of freedom allowed in artificially blocking win-win transactions
between poor generic pharmaceutical-consumers and would-be producers
of cheaper generic medications. That is, there is a tradeoff between the
loss of freedom (and its associated economic deadweight loss) involved in
baring hypothetical win-win pharmaceutical sales that would move
forward under a less restrictive IP regime at prices between marginal cost
and the very high patent (monopolistic) price, and the economic demands
of creators and investors.108
The Rawlsian, given the demand for maximizing the position of the
least well-off, will, at the level of theory and operation, hold a position
with regard to IP which is quite distinct from the utilitarian, maximizing
net aggregate welfare. This would present itself as a debate over the length
of the time-component of patents (for Rawlsians shorter, than for, say,
Lockeans and utilitarians). The Rawlsian will have no tolerance for the
proportionality metric of the above described trade-off required by the
utilitarian or the Lockean. The differing principles require or demand a
differing proportionality, in this regard. An appeal to the free-floating
midlevel principle of proportionality will not resolve the matter, nor does it
obviously appear in any overlap of the application of the principles.109

principles of IP law.”). But, this way of laying things out—starting with a foundational account of
patent and then reverse engineering the fit of midlevel principles—runs strongly counter to Merges’s
avowed methodology and raises serious questions concerning the contours of his approach.
107
See Pogge, Rimmer & Rubenstein, supra note 4, at 145 (providing a lucid account of the
ostensive rational for pharmaceutical patents, but objecting that such rational is not, in fact,
justificatory).
108
Id.
109
The conflict may well be greater than this dispute over patent duration. Rawlsian philosopher
Thomas Pogge, for example, maintains that principles of justice require a significant abandonment of
the (monopolistic) patent system in favor of what he describes as a Health Impact Fund, based largely,
instead, upon a system of tax and transfer: “If rich countries and their citizens desire medical
innovation, then they must find ways of funding it that either leave the [market] freedom of the poor
unreduced or else adequately compensate the poor for the loss of freedom imposed upon them [via
monopolistic patents].” Id., at 145. The point is that differing foundational values may require differing
property approaches that do not lend themselves to the type of overlap Merges’s pluralistic account
may require or that his midlevel principles would address.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this Review, I have attempted to explain, analyze, and, at times,
critique Merges’s view of foundational normative principles of property
and their relationship to what he describes as midlevel principles of IP law.
I embrace Merges’s view that IP law must be informed of normative
theory. I am less certain, however, of the compatibility between the
plurality of foundational theories and the midlevel principles he espouses.
I have raised reservations about the normative role Merges’s midlevel
principles might play, given his views of their independence of
foundations. These concerns are strongest in the context of maximizing
distributive theories such as Rawlsianism. I have also questioned whether
or not Merges’s midlevel principles actually play the doctrinal role he
assigns to them.
Despite these concerns, Justifying Intellectual Property is a
theoretically sophisticated work that defends a powerful and, for many,
desirable middle-ground thesis. The book fills a void in the theoretical
work on IP law and provides a much needed, careful, philosophically
insightful and reliable account of foundational property theories, which are
enormously helpful to those with IP law interests. Justifying Intellectual
Property has and will continue to spark reinvigorated interest in work at
the intersection of property theory and IP law, in legal method, and on
questions concerning the role midlevel principles play in the private law.

